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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to consider

Plaintiffs' claims regarding the illegality of Defendants'
conduct?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs'

appeal of the trial courts' denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and for a new trial on
the issues of mistake and illegality?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs'

appeal on the issue of whether the trial judge improperly based
his decision on his physical inspection of the property at or
around the time of trial where the appearance of the property at
that time differed greatly from its appearance at the time the
alleged misrepresentations occurred?
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 14, 1990 is invoked pursuant to Rule
46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Section 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
Section 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
Section 57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
Section 6-6-1 Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper,
Utah (1984).
Section 6-3-8 Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper,
Utah (1984).
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. Sanders, appeal
from a judgment allowing Defendants to foreclose upon their Trust
Deed and awarding them money damages.

Plaintiffs then filed a

Motion for a New Trial and renewed their Motion to Amend Their
Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented at Trial.
Court denied that Motion on October 26, 1988.

The

Plaintiffs appeal

both those Orders.
In March of 1979, Defendants Ovard purchased two acres of
property from Mr. Layne Newman.

(Trial Transcript, (hereinafter

"Tr.") 58, Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D)

That transaction was

accomplished by two trust deeds, each covering one acre.
2 06)

(Tr.

At approximately the same time, Mr. Ovard and Mr. Newman

submitted a request for a variance to the City of Draper. (Tr.
61, Trial Exhibit 7-P)

Their request was accompanied by a plat

showing five acres divided into a three-acre lot (Mr. Newman's)
and a two-acre lot (Mr. Ovard's).

(Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P)

The City of Draper granted Mr. Ovard a variance to build one home
on his two acre lot subject to three conditions.
Trial Exhibit 8-P)

(Tr. 61, 64,

Mr. Ovard then constructed his home on one

acre of the two-acre parcel.
In July of 1982, the Sanders purchased the home built by
Martin Ovard in Draper, Utah and only one acre of the lot . (Tr.
151)

Thereafter, Plaintiffs decided to make inquiries into

purchasing the other acre for themselves.

During this period of

time, the Defendant knew that the two acres had not been legally
subdivided. (Tr. 60)

2

Joseph Sanders contacted Fred Hale, the realtor who had sold
them their residence regarding the remaining acre. (Tr. 153)
They examined the listing agreement and a plat map which had been
supplied by the Defendants1 realtor and agreed to make an offer
on the property owned by the Ovards. (Tr. 153)

The amount of

their offer was based in part upon the asking price for other
parcels of the same approximate size which could be built upon.
(Tr. 156, 157)

Plaintiff paid $26,000 for the land. (R. 201,

Trial Exhibits 1-P, 2-P and 3-P)
Subsequent to this time, Plaintiff discovered that the
unimproved parcel he had purchased from the Defendant and the
parcel upon which his residence was situated, had been illegally
subdivided by the Defendants. (Tr. 17)

Mr. Sanders further

learned that both parcels were subject to a variance which
imposed certain conditions upon the land and that the City of
Draper would not issue a building permit for the unimproved
property. (Tr. 168)
Plaintiffs filed this action in the Third Judicial District
Court and the matter was tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel
on October 2 6 and 27, 1987. At the conclusion of those
proceedings, Plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings to conform to
the evidence of illegality.

Judge Noel took the matter under

advisement until he had an opportunity to physically inspect the
property. (R. 142)

Judge Noel did not rule on the motion until

hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial.

3

The Court issued a memorandum opinion on December 4, 1987,
finding in favor of the Defendants on their Counterclaim and
finding no cause of action on Plaintiffs' Complaint. (R.142-143)
The Court's ruling sets forth certain observations about the
property which were not consistent with the appearance of the
property when purchased by the Plaintiffs in 1982. (R. 142-143)
The ruling did not address the claim of illegality.
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for a New Trial and to Amend
the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence (R. 222)

The trial

court denied both of those Motions and Plaintiffs now appeal
seeking a new trial. (R. 255)
On March 13, 1990, arguments were entertained by a panel of
the Court of Appeals on Plaintiffs' appeal pursuant to Rule 31 of
the Unah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A decision was rendered

two days later denying Plaintiffs' appeal and Plaintiffs now seek
a Writ of Certiorari and review of that decision.
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
I.

THE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF THE
ILLEGALITY OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT
WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
A NEW TRIAL.

Plaintiffs argued that there was sufficient evidence of
illegality introduced at trial to support a finding that the
issue was tried to the trial court with the consent of
Defendants.
case.

A Motion to Amend was made at the end of Plaintiff's

Other jurisdictions have held that the defense of

illegality may be raised for the first time on appeal.
4

Mitchell

v, American Savings and Loan Assfn. 593 P.2d 692, 693-94 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979); Greer v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 674
P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

Regardless of when the issue

was first raised, an important question of law is at issue
regarding Plaintiffs defense of illegality.
The illegal conduct of Defendants in selling the unimproved
one-acre parcel to the Plaintiffs is clear from a review of the
record below in connection with a number of state and local
statutes.
In the trial, Defendant Ovard acknowledged that his property
was not legally subdivided. (Tr. 60)

There had been previously

submitted to Draper City a plat seeking to divide the five acre
parcel into five one acre lots.
Q.
...Could you give me an approximate date when you
became aware that the plat had been submitted?
A.
Well, before I built the house, I found out it hadn't
been approved as a subdivision.
(Tr. 60)

Despite the fact that it was an illegal "subdivision11,

the land was sold to the Plaintiffs as a legal lot.
The laws are clear that the sale to Sanders was illegal.
§ 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), requires that a
division of property into lots be approved by the governing body
of the city or town in which the property is located.

Further,

§ 57-5-5 makes it a misdemeanor violation to sell a lot before it
is acknowledged, filed and recorded.

Mr. Ovard never had his

division of the two acres described in the variance acknowledged,
filed or recorded with the appropriate local authorities.
5

Another applicable statute is § 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended) which reads:
Whoever being the owner or agent of any land
located in a subdivision within any area for
which a major street plan has been adapted by
the planning commission and the legislative
body, except for land located in a recorded
subdivision, transfers or sales such land
without first preparing a subdivision plat
and having such plat approved by said
planning commission and legislative body and
recorded in the office of the county recorder
shall be guilty of a violation of this act
for each lot so transferred or sold and the
description by metes and bounds in the
instrument of transfer or other document used
in the process of selling or transferring
shall not exempt the transaction from such
violation, except that in subdivisions of
less than ten lots, land may be sold by metes
and bounds, without necessity of recording a
plat if all the following conditions are met:
(a) The subdivision layout shall have been
first approved in writing by the planning
commission, (b) The subdivision is not
traversed by the mapped lines of a proposed
street as shown on the official map or maps
of the municipality, and does not require the
dedication of any land for street or other
public purposes, and (c) If the subdivision
is located in a zoned area, each lot in the
subdivision meets the frontage, width and
area requirements of the zoning ordinance or
has been granted a variance form such
requirements by the board of adjustment,
(emphasis added).
This statute again makes it illegal to sell "lots" which
have not been approved by the appropriate planning commission and
recorded with the county recorder.

It does set forth three

exceptions to that general rule, however, those are not
applicable to the action taken by Mr. Ovard.

6

It is clear that Ovard's sale of the unimproved acre of land
and the adjoining acre with the home situated thereupon violated
these statutes as well as Draper ordinances.

His illeaal conduct

is sufficient to justify a finding in favor of the Plaintiffs or
to hold a new trial on this issue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION
TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND
THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE.

This Court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) as a mandatory requirement that the
trial court grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to the
evidence to include issues tried by the express or implied
consent of the parties.

The issues of mistake and illegality

were tried with the implied consent of the Defendants.

Lloyd's

Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987);

Poulsen v. Poulsen. 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983).

At the trial in this matter, evidence was received without
objection relating to the illegality of Mr. Ovard's division of
his property into two one-acre parcels. Utah law is clear about
the legality of the division and subsequent sale of the Ovard
property.

§ 57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

That

statute sets forth the procedural requirements for legally
subdividing property and it was clear from the testimony at trial

7

that Mr. Ovard did not comply with these requirements.

That

chapter of the Utah Code continues in § 57-5-5 Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended) which reads:
If any such person shall sell any lot so
platted according to such plat before it is
made out, acknowledged, filed and recorded as
aforesaid, such person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell.
The evidence introduced at trial clearly established that
Ovard sold an unapproved lot to Sanders in violation of this
statute.

In addition, there are also Draper City ordinances

which were violated by Mr. Ovard's division of his property into
one-acre parcels.

§ 6-6-1 C; § 6-3-8

Land Use and Development

Regulations of Draper, Utah.
Based upon the evidence introduced at trial and the judicial
interpretation of Rule 15(b), the trial court had no discretion
over whether to grant leave to amend.

The decision of the Court

of Appeals denying Plaintiffs1 appeal on this point is directly
contrary to this interpretation of that rule.
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S VIEW OF THE
PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR HIS
DECISION WAS IMPROPER.
On appeal, Plaintiff raised an important question of law
concerning the propriety of the Judge basing his decision on his
view of the property as it appeared at the time of trial.
Plaintiffs believed that his view would be used to put the
evidence he had heard at trial into some sort of physical
context.

Instead, as was apparent from his opinion, he relied

upon the layout of the property in making his decision that the
Plaintiffs should have been alerted to potential access problems
to their property.
8

Moreover, the court feels the Plaintiffs did
not exercise due diligence at the time of the
purchase to determine the status of the
property. The court is also of the opinion,
after having viewed the property, that due to
the location of the property, the road
leading from the main paved road ending in
what appears to be somewhat of a cal-de-sac
(sic), and under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person should
have been alerted that there may be access
problems associated with the back parcel of
property that should be investigated,
(emphasis added)
fl

The power of the court to order a view should be exercised

with caution.

The trial judge should be satisfied that

conditions at the time he views the premises are substantially
the same as they were at the time that the claim arose.

He must

also be satisfied that a personal inspection by him will be fair
to all parties concerned and is reasonably necessary to do
justice between them."

4 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common

Law (Chadbourn rev. 1972) S 1169 (quoting from Greenberg v.
Waterbury, 117 Conn. 67, 73-74, 167 A. 83, 85 (1933)).

The

concerns expressed in this treatise reflect the situation which
occurred in the present case. The premises involved had a very
different appearance when viewed by the judge then when viewed by
the Plaintiffs as potential purchasers six years prior.
The Court of Appeals erred in not seating aside the decision
of the trial court where it was based in part upon his view of
the property which had changed considerably in appearance in the
intervening six years.

9

CONCLUSION
This Court has a great deal of discretion in deciding
whether to grant a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The

Petitioners herein have set forth the special and important
reasons which justify the issuance of a Writ in this case.
The most important reason is the existence of the defense of
illegality for the Plaintiffs.

The record clearly establishes

that the Ovards violated numerous state and local statutes with
their division of a two acre lot into two one-acre parcels and
the subsequent sales of those parcels.

The Defendant admitted

the illegal "subdivision" in his testimony.
Petitioners also contend that the trial court lacked
discretion on whether to allow Plaintiffs to amend their
pleadings to conform to the evidence of illegality and mistake
which was introduced at trial.

Furthermore, it was error for the

trial judge to base his decision on his view of the property
without first ascertining the changes in the property's
appearance in the six years since Plaintiffs1 cause of action
accrued.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners ask that this Court grant them a Writ
of Certiorari and review the decision of the Court of Appeals in
this case.
DATED THIS

/ y

day of

/^/(AA^

, 1990.

f. GREEN

Attorney for Plaintiffs

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
COMES NOW, Frederick N. Green, attorney for the Plaintiffs
in the above-entitled action, and hereby certifies that the has
served Thomas N. Crowther with four (4) copies of the Plaintiffs'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari by mailing true and correct
copies thereof to Thomas N. Crowther of the firm of Parsons &
Crowther, attorneys for Defendants, at 455 South 300 East, Suite
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this

Api/j 1

lo

day of

. 1990.

DATED THIS

\2$L
lQ

day of April, 1990
GREE

GREEN

Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
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MAR 1 ;>fC20
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

yC^J/X^^
v

Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M.
Sanders,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Appellants,
Case No. 890063-CA
v.
Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard,
Ben F. Ovard, Helen T. Ovard
and Jax Hayes Pettery,
Defendants and Respondents.
v.
Joseph D. Sanders, Cheryl M.
Sanders; Utah State Tax
Commission; Salt Lake
County; and Insurance Company
of North America,
Counterdefendants.

Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (on Rule 31
Hearing).
The judgment and findings of the trial court are
supported by the evidence and the record before the trial
court.

Also, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to

allow plaintiff's amendment.
The judgment is affirmed.
Dated ~thjLs

/fr^Say

FOR THE COURT:/

-///'/

Aft*

Regna l T ^ G a t f f p J u d g e

of March,

1990.
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I Dean Lancaster, pro se.
der when the prosecution was unable to
David L Wilkinson, Kimberly Hornak, prove the aggravating circumstances with
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon- which he had been charged Inhishabeat
corpus petition, plaintiff appears to allege
that he thought he had pleaded to '"uniateih
PER CURIAM:
tional murder" and that be should k n
in propria persona, a pe- to® sentenced to one to fifteen years1
tition for post-convictionreliefin the trial imprisonment instead offiveyears to Mi
court with respect to his guilty plea to and Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of
subsequent conviction of second degree knowingly and intentionally committing the
murder. The trial court dismissed the peti- offense and was therefore unlawfully b
tion as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not prisoned and that he had been denied due
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty process and effective assistance of counsel
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B In addition, plaintiff challenged the eoufr
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was tutionality of the statutes under which he
therefore not permissible. Wereverseand m d ^ and sentenced
remand for entry offindingson the merits. « . / , . .
, „ A1 . ,
;
6
This Court hasrepeatedlystated that
In response to plaintiffs petition, the hhm ^ b not a substjtute for ^
State brought a motion to dismiss on the cannot be used to perform the function of
ground that under the rationale of 5tote t;. ^ ^
^
PortertCook,
Gibbons, 740 P 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), plain- w m m m m m).
^
bff was precluded from bringing a motion m t ^ m m m m m
or post^nvictonreliefuntil he had fat m) m m % ^ m m
1 ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ l e . . ^ 702(Utahl979). But it has also recognized
plea. The trial court adopted that rationale .. . . , , .
,
: ... j . j . ., ,/tx^
thatreviewby habeas corpus is appropnin its order denying writ of habeas corpus,
ate in unusual circumstances to assure funand the Staterepeatsit before this Court in
damental fairness and toreexaminea conchallenging the merits of plaintiffs habeas viction when the nature of the alleged error
is such that it would be unconscionable not
State u ^6orw is inapposite here. Gil. ^ ^ a m ^ Corfianna, 660 P.2d at 1115
bons pteaded guilty to several charges and ^
^ mm^f k ^
^
then appealed dmctly after the trial court
^ m rf ^ M m rf M
^ n i T 1 ™ Procedurespecificallyprovidesthataprii.
mipmonment He did notfilea motion to onerwhoa88ertsa8ubstaDtWdenialofhig
withdraw his guilty plea before perfecting
., .. . ...
. ,,,
..
. V.'«..
; . . , , . constitutional nghts Mmay institute a prohis appeal, and the State argued that this
ceeding under this rule." See also MarCourt should decline to consider the guilty
tinez v, Smith, supra, where this Court
plea issue because it was not raised below,
held a petition for habeas corpus reviewa740 P.2d at 1311. This Court declined to
ble without firstrequiringthe withdrawal
follow the State's request and remanded
of a guilty plea. Given the allegations
the case to enable Gibbons to file a motion
plaintiff
made in his petition, it was thereto withdraw his guilty plea,retainingjurisfore
error
for the trial court to dismiss the
diction over the case for further action.
State v, G\bbom did not represent a collat-petition without granting a hearing.
eral attack on the guilty plea.
Without the benefit offindings,this
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post- Court is in no position toreviewthe valid*
conviction petition to challenge the validity ty of plaintiff8 claims. It is safetoUr
of his guilty plea some nine years after the sume that trial courts prefer to give short
time for a direct appeal had run It ap- shrift to the many postconviction petition!
pears from his handwritten pleadings that which they decide lack merit It is equally
te waa originally charged with first degree safe to assume that an appellate court W&
murder, but pleaded to second degree mur- be unable toreviewthe case in a vacuum

LLOYD'S DELIMITED v. NATURE'S WAY

Utah 507

and will have toremandit where no ratio- was not precludedfromseeking reformanale for dismissal or denial is given. A tion of commission schedule under consimple finding, on the other hand, will suf- tract; and (3) middleman was not entitled
fice in the vast majority of cases to limit torecovercosts of deposing two witnesses
the judicial process to one review. The and serving subpoena on one witness.
traJ courts basis fw dismissing plaintiffs
Vacated and remanded
petition in this case was erroneous, as stated. The record is too sparse for this Court
to determine whether the issues raised by 1. Pleading *448(4)
the pleadings were legal, so that it could
In breach of contract action in which
affirm the trial court on the ground that middleman who sold "coffee extender prodthe claims were properlyresolvedas a mat- uct" for suffer sought to recow conuniter of law, See Gonmles v, Morris, 610 sions under contract with supplier, trial
Pid 1285,1286 (Utah 1980). Instead, it court erred in denying middleman's motion
appears that plaintiff claims irregularity in to amend to include cause of action for
thereceptionof his guilty plea, an issue reformation of contract so the commission
that should have been considered by the schedules could be changed; issue of corntrial court.
mission schedules was not raised until secHe case isremandedfor entry of find- ond day of trial and court did not allow
ings on the merits,
middlemantosubmit evidence on issue of
parties' intent in entering contract
2. Reformation of Instruments £=25
Middleman who sold "coffee extender
product" for supplier was not precluded
from seekingreformationof commission
schedule under contract with supplier because contract included integration clause.
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a corporation, 3. Reformation of Instruments & M \
Plaintiff and Appellant,
45(1)
Reformation
of contract is equitable
?.
remedy which must be pled with particularNATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
ity and established by clear and convincing
a corporation, Defendant and
proof.
Respondent
4, Costs « H 193
No. 86H11-CA.
In middleman's action against supplier
Court of Appeals of Utah.
to recover commissions under contract with
supplier, middleman was not entitled to reApril 21,1988.
cover costs of deposing two witnesses and
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules
Middleman brought action for breach Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d).
of contract against supplier, seeking ac- 5, Costs **2W
counting and judgment for sums due under
Party claiming entitlement to cost of
contract The Third District Court, Salt
depositions has burden of demonstrating
lake County, Dean E. Conder, J,, entered
that depositions werereasonablynecessary
judgment in favor of supplier, and middleand whether that burden is met is within
man appealed The Court of Appeals,
sound discretion of trial court Rules Civ,
Gnenwwd, J., held that (1) trial court
Proc, Rule 54(d).
erred in denying middleman's motion to
inendtoinclude cause of action for refor-i Appeal and Error **9$4(1)
mm of contract so the commission
Trial court's ruling on whether to
Kbedules could be changed; (2) middleman award party the costs of depositions is pre-

<508 Utah

I LOYD'S UNL1MT
^ •-•w'^fifc-
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which stated that Lloyd's would receive
$1.00 commission for each pound of productsold On August 11,1982, after Dow.
die and Burningham discussed the document, Dowdle crossed out the commission
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), LesKe W. new schedule in the handwritten contract
Slaugh, Ray G, Martineau, P.C., Provo, for which, as found by the trial court, provided
the following commission schedule:
plaintiff and appellant
1 unit—€0 packets pack: i5<
Terry M. Crellin (argued), M. Wayne 1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack:
jjfe
1 unit—5 lb, bulk pack: 50*
for defendant and respondent
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack: $1,00
The parties then signed the agreement
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
Several
days later, Dowdle's secretary
and BENCH, JJ.
typed the agreement from the handwritten
version. The typewritten agreement set
OPINION
forth thf same commission schedule as set
GREENWOOD, Judge:
out above except the commission on the 5
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), ini- lb. bulk pack was .50c rather than 50t,
tiated this action against defendant, Na- The typewritten agreement also repeated
ture's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's verbatim the following clause from the
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an handwritten agreement 'This agreement
accounting and judpent for sums due un- contains the entire understanding of the
der the contract The court found that the parties hereto and may not be altered,
parties had entered into a valid and en- amended, modified, or discharged in any
forceable contract and awarded Lloyd's way whatsoever except by subsequent
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the agreement in writing by all parties hereto."
court improperly denied its motion to The parties then signed die typewritten
amend the complaint to include a cause of agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's
action for reformation and that the trial $500, representing commission earned from
court'sfindingsof fact were clearly errone- April 24,1982 to August 1,1982. The
ous. Lloyd's requests modification of the parties did not make a formal accounting
lower court's award and entry of judgment of the sizes or amount of the product sold
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Al- to earn the $500 commission.
ternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judg- Between August 1,1982 and February
ment be vacated and the case remanded. 28,1984, Nature's Way received more than
We reverse and remand.
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd's.
FACR
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action,
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdk (Dowdle), alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burning- that Nature's Way owed it commissions
ham (Burningham), president of Nature's based on the following commission schedWay, began negotiating terms of a contract ule:
involving a "coffee extender product" 60 packets pack: $ .25
(product). The contract was to provide 2 lb. bulk pack: .35
that Lloyd's would receive a commission 5 lb. bulk pack: ,50
from Nature's Way for product sold to 37 lb. bulk pack: 1.00
Yurika Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Na- Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5
ture's Way in consideration of Lloyd's ef- stated 'Defendant denies the validity rf
forts in inducing Yurika to purchase and the agreement and therefore denies the
market the product In early August 1982, allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintifflj
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document complaint to the effect that defendant»

sumed correct and will not be disturbed
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest
clear abuse of discretion Rules CixProc,
Rule 54(d).

[2]«evidence is

sum of money.
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ing to their dispute. What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and
ao opportunity to meet them. When this
is accomplished, t k is all that is required Our rules provide for liberality
to allow examination into and settlement
of all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a
new issue if he so requests.
Accord William a State Farm In Co.,
656 P.2d 966,970-71 (Utah 1982),

During the first day of trial, the parties

of what consideration Lloyd's was to pn
vide in order to earn the commission
Burningham testified that he expected
Dowdle to do a lot of traveling to procure
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regid
to payment of Dowdle's travel expense
"That's the reason why I offered the con*,
mission. And I offered that—I offered it
to him because it would have been very
lucrative for him."1
On the second day of trial, Burningham
B. Procedural Background
testified under direct examination as to
In order to properly assess the validity of what the contract said, as follows:
the trial court's rulings, we must first pro- Q. What does it state will be payable
vide a rather detailed description of the
for one unit of the two-pound bulk
procedural history of this case.
pack?
The record reveals that proceedings in A. .25 cents.
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of Q. .25 cents?
lack of consideration, up until the second A. That's correct
day of trial As stated earlier, Nature's Q. Quarter of a cent, I guess.
Way's answer to the complaint generally
denied liability under the contract, without On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel
specifically addressing the commission rate began to question Burningham about the
amounts alleged in the complaint The an- intent of the parties on the commission rate
swer also included an affirmative defense amounts. The trial court sustained Naof lack of consideration' Prior to trial, ture's Way's objection to such questioning.
Lloyd's filed a motion for partial summary After trial, but before the court entered
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest The mo- Lloyd's filed a motion for an order granttion was supported by the affidavit of a ing leave to file an amended complaint to
certified public accountant which calculated conform to the evidence tjo include a cause
the amount due under the contract utilizing of action for reformation of the contract
the commission schedule as alleged in the Lloyd's alsofileda post trial memorandum
complaint and invoices of sales made by which included excerpts from the deposiNature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memo- tion of Burningham, as follows:
randum in support of the motion and Q. Had you made commissions to
Lloyd's... you would pay him 35
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again
cents for each two pound bulk pack?
set forth the same schedule as in the complaint Nature's Way's memorandum in A. Correct
opposition to the motion for summary judg- Q. Based on the 300 figure?
ment states "Defendant has no objection to
A. Correct
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested
Q.
For the five pound bulk you would
facts other than that important uncontestpay him 50 cents based on the 180
ed facts were omitted" The memorandum
figure?
then sets forth additional "facts" but does
not mention the commission rate amounts. A. Correct
lie court denied the motion for summary Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidirt
which stated that he habitually noted da*
1. This teitinxmy strikes us u incootistent with
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement

yielded commissioos of only (416.25 over M
time period In question.

LLOYD'S .^LIMITED i. NATURE'S WAY

Utah 5 H

BHI points erroneously, as was done on at [1] CoosequentJy, we bokl that the trial
least part of the handwritten agreement court erred in denying the motion to amend
•. Several months after the trial the court to »** * &**of «*•fop reformation
^fitoedfimiingsof fact, which included the of the contract where the issue of comiM[ftDowmg: the handwritten agreement exe- ** 8chedttle8 was not raised unta the
toted by the parties had commisaion rates second day of trial and where the court did
if i5e, ,35*, 50t, and $1.00; the typed wt allot Lloyd'stosubmit evidence cm the
agreement executed by the parties had issue of the parties'intent in entering 4e
commission rates of ,25<, .35c, .50*, and contract Because the motion to amend
(LOO; and the intent of the parties with should have been granted, we reverse and
respect to commissions did not change be- remand for further proceedings on the reftween execution of the two agreements, ormation issue.
Further, the court found that the parties
hid stipulated to the amount of product
D. Reformation of Contract
iold during thetimein question. The court
eooduded that the typed contract was a [2,3] We further note that the trial
raHd, integrated and'enforceable contract court apparently believed that the ^pewi*
Centered judgment for $487.87 and costs teD "f*0?1i ^ n o t » M *mtter of
law, be reformed, because of the inteof $138.77.
gration
clause included in the contract1
The court denied the motion to amend
the complaint to include a cause of action Reformation of a contract is an equitable
remedy which must be pled with particularfor reformation
ity and established by clear and convincing
C. Application of Law
proof.
Brigg$v.LiddeHMmm}m
In this case, when, on the second day of (Utah 1985). The Briggt court stated:
trial, Burningham first testified that the A mtmi mj ta nimei for either of
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack two reasons, first, if the instrument
was a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney does not embody the intentions of both
did not object to the testimony on the parties to the contract, a mutual mistake
ground that it was not within the issues has occurred, andreformationis approframed by the pleadings. Therefore, be- priate. Second, if one party is laboring
cause no objection was raised, we conclude under a mistake about a contract term
that there was implied consent to trying of and that mistake either has been induced
the issue and the first part of Rule 15(b) by the other party or is known by and
ippiies, allowing consideration of the issue. conceded to by the other party, then the
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of inequitable nature of the other party's
the issue of commission rates only on the conduct will have the same operable efsecond day of trial, and by the court's fect as a mistake, and reformation is
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to permissible.
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find
that it was an abuse of discretion to con- li at 772. Reformation has also been apcomitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to plied in instances of drafter error. "Reforthe newly raised issue, by the court's refus- mation is clearly appropriate where there is
al to consider evidence of intent and denial a variance between the written deed and
of the motion to amend the complaint to the true agreement of the parties caused
plead reformation of contract There was by a draftsman." HotHnger v. Jensen, 684
no evidence of prejudice which would result P.2d 1271f 1273 (Utah 1984).
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment On remand, the court should allow
would allow realization of one of the crite- Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can
m under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the muster to establish its right to reformation
merits of the action."
of the contract Moreover, it is not preI Hie court may have beiieved reformation was
not availableforother reasons, but the intc-

gratioa clause was the ooiy rationak menttoned
by the court
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eluded from doing so by the integration
clause included in the contract An integration clause may prevent enforcement of
prior or contemporaneous agreements on
the same subject, but "does not prevent
proof of fraudulent representations by a
party to the contract, or of legality, accident, or mistake..., [P]aper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements
of fact to be true when they are actually
untrue," Corinn on Contracts, § 518 at
405^)7 (1960).

n. COSTS
[4-6] Lloyd's also contends that the
court erred in failing to award it the costs
of deposing Burningham and Webb and
serving a subpoena on Burningham. Utah
R,Civ.P. 54(d) provides that except as the
rule otherwise provides, "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs...."
The general rule is that under Utah
R.Civ.P, 54(d) "costs" means those fees
which are "required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses...." Frampton t>. Wilson, 605 Pid 771,774 (Utah 1980). However, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that the expenses of taking depositions are
also allowable as costs if they were reasonably necessary. John P m Assoc, Inc v.
Davis, 588 P.2d 713,715 (Utah 1978). Deposition costs are generally allowed as necessary and reasonable "where the development of the case is of such a complex
nature that discovery cannot be accomplished through the less expensive method
of interrogatories, requests for admissions
and requests for the production of documents." Highland Constr, Co, v. Union
Pot ML, 683 P.2d 1042,1051 (Utah 1984).
The party claiming entitlement to the costs
of depositions has the burden of demonstrating that the depositions were reasonably necessary and whether that burden is
met is within the sound discretion of the
trial court li; first Sec Bank of Utah
U v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563,567 (Utah
1974), The trial court's ruling on whether
to award a party costs of depositions is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. First Sec

M , 5 2 1 P . 2 d a t 5 6 7 , The Utah Supreme
Court has declined to extend the ruk
which allows recovery of the cost of taking
a deposition, to expenses such as service g
a subpoena, Frampton, 605 Pid tt Tto
Lloyd's claims that the depositions flf
Burningham and Webb were essential fqfj
the development and presentation of tSf
case and that Webb's deposition was t a k ?
because both parties anticipated Aat Webr
would be unavailable to testify at trial $
addition, Lloyd's argues that because |
dons of Burningham's depositions
used at trial, it should be awarded the c
of Burningham's deposition Lloyd's afy
contends that it should have been awardelj
the costs of serving Burningham with a
subpoena to insure his appearance at the
deposition. Nature's Way had previously
failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to
compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that
the subpoena was necessary to secun*
Burningham's appearance at the deposit
tion.
Nature's Way, to the contrary, arguei
that because Lloyd's did not use WebbV
deposition at trial and did not publish Bonh
ingham's or Webb's deposition at trial, the
court properly denied Lloyd's the costs d
the deposition. Nature's Way also cofr
tends that Lloyd's could have avoided the
cost of the subpoena by telephoning N*
ture's Way's attorney to see if the corpo*
tion would produce Burningham for a deposition, and, therefore, the trial court eft
rectly denied Lloyd's the cost incurred ia
We find that, in view of these argfr
ments, the trial court's decision to deny
Lloyd's the costs of the two depositions
was reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's failed
to prove that the deposition costs wen
reasonably necessary and could not be I*
complished through less expensive meanly
Therefore, because the burden of p r o ]
was not met and because the trial courfi
decision was reasonable, we hold that fa
trial court did not abuse its discretion i|y
denying Lloyd's the costs of taking, m

'ofATE v, STUBS
y e also hold that the trial court's decii to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoenaj Burningham was not unreasonable, in
\ of Franpton, where the court de| to extend the rules for awarding
ets to expenses such as service
9 and vacated the trial court's
of such costs. Therefore, we hold
the trial court did not abuse its discre, in refusing to award Lloyd's the costs
bjerring the subpoena.
F
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Appeals held that petition failed to satisfy
applicable requirements.
Petition denied.

Criminal Law <»1871
Petition for certificate of probable
cause lacked required affidavit of counsel
or memorandum of law supporting defendantfs position that issues presented on appeal were novel or fairly debatable.

III. FINDINGS

Bradley P. Rich, Yengich, Rich, Xaix 4
third claim of error is that the Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
E l l court's findings are not supported by
m evidence. Because we hold that that
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen.,
m trial court erred in denying the motion Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen, for
&'amend, we need not reach the issue of plaintiff and respondent
Aether the findings are supported by the
evidence.
Before JACKSON, ORME and
GREENWOOD,
JJ. (On Law and
t He judgment of the trial court is vacated and the matter remanded for further
Jjweeedings in accordance with this opinion.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:

BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur.

This matter is before the court on a
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause.
Appellant's counsel filed the petition on
March 10,1988. It was accompanied by a
brief Memorandum of Points and Authorities, but was not supported by the affidavit
of counsel required by State v. Neeley, 707
P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme
Court set forth the rationale for the proceSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
dure mandated in Neeley as follows:
Respondent,
The record of proceedings below is not
available in this Court at the time such
petitions are brought In addition, the
Dickie Lynn STUKES, Defendant
petitions filed by the defendants are genand Appellant
erally conclusory and contain little information
concerning the case. The attorNo. 880154-CA.
ney general, who is by law required to
Court of Appeals of Utah.
argue before this Court, is uninformed
concerning the facts of the case or the
April 22,1988.
proceedings taken in the court below and
therefore finds it difficult to respond to
petitions for certificates of probable
Following ruling of the Third District cause. His Court is likewise un»
p r t , Summit County, Pat B. Brian, J., on informed concerning the record antQ oral
Jjprch issue, defendant filed petition for argument In order that this Court may
prt&bte of probable cause. The Court of make an informed decision in issuing cer-
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PhTllii E. COLMAN9 Plaintiff
and Respondent,
?,

Willian J. COULIN, Defendant
and Appellant
N0.8JK2MA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct (1X7.
Husband appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., which divided property in
connection with divorce. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J, held that (1) evidence sustained trial court's determination to pierce
corporate veil of husband's corporations,
and (2) distribution was proper.
Affirmed.

operation of the corporate entity, that cor
porate records were not kept, and that the
husband used the corporation and other
corporate shells as a facade for his personal business operations.
i CorpontkHis ^1.6(10)

Corporate veil which protects stockholders from individual liability will be
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously.
i Corporationi t=l,^)
To disregard corporate entity under alter ego doctrine, there must be shown such
a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, and it
must be shown that, if the corporate form
were observed, it would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or result in an inequity;
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actual fraud but he must show that a failure to
pierce the corporation veil would result in
an injustice.

1. Heading * m
6. Corporations **\M\)
If theory of recovery is fully tried by Factors which are significant in deter
the parties, court may base its decision on mining whether corporate veil should be
that theory and deem the pleadings amend- pierced are undercapitalization of a oneed, even if the theory was not originally man corporation, failure to observe corpopleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the rate formalities, nonpayment of dividends,
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact, siphoning of corporate funds by dominant
been tried and that the procedure has been stockholder, nonfunctioning of other offiauthorized by the express or implied con- cers or directors, absence of corporate
sent of the parties must be evident from records, use of corporation as a facade or
the record.
operations of the dominant shareholder,
and
use of the corporate entity in promote
t Divorce «=>283
ing injustice or fraud.
Although alter ego issue was not specifically raised in pleadings, where entire I Corporations Plttl)
trial testimony concerned husband's control Failure to observe corporate formaliover assets in question, the issue was tried ties, which may justify piercing corporate
by the consent of the parties and trial court veil, includes such activities as commence*
properly based its decision on that issue. ment of business without the issuance of
shares, lack of shareholders at directors
I Divorte *253(2)
meetings, lack of signing of consents, and
Finding that corporation was husmaking of decisions by shareholders u if
band's alter ego was supported by evidence
they were partners.
that hereferredto the corporation's check- i Corporations ^L«l)
ing account as his personal account, that he
Rationale used by courts in peraittinf
ing that he was acting on behalf of anyone pal shareholder or owner conducts hit pci%
othar than himself, that the officers and vate and corporate business on an ister*^
directors played little or no role in the changeable or joint basis as if they weft

COLMAN T. COLMAN
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«e^he » without standing to complain Frank J. ADen, Salt Lake Otv for d*
wkenanmN^doesttesam,
fendant and ap^llT
^'
). Dirora t=mi)
"""••w

«';wJwe,A«eniOHOII,!5

Former spouses attempting to shield for plaintiff and respondent
lets from a winrUrrk**)^.p.vfvivj vuour
botion by using a corporate form are espe- &fow BILLINGS, GARFF and
dally looked upon with judicial disfavor. JACKSON.
I J, Divorce *=2512
m m
Fact that property distribution may
not have been mathematically equal is not {j^yyrp j U ( w
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse
of discretion as fair and equitable property Defendant/appellant William J. Cohnan
distribution is not necessarily an equal dis* appeals from a property settlement judgJ^JJ^
ment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyllis E. Colman stemming from their 1977
II Divorce PIMM
divorce. He seeks reversal of the judgTrial court did not abuse its discretion ment
in dividing property after piercing corpo- The parties were divorced after a twentyrate veil on the grounds that the corpora- four year childless marriage during which
tion was the husband's alter ego.
^ mM gubgtaDtia j pn)perty Qn
^ *1977'* ^ ¥ ^rf*wce,
they executed a written property settlemt
* * * Mm ^ m M
not beenresolvedas to which assets controlled by defendant were part of the mari^ **> tt ^mt ^M ta to
provide plaintiff with a "complete accounting of all stocks currently owned by him or
It Estoppel «2(4)
in which he [had] any interest," and a
Estoppel arises when there is a false "complete accounting of all royalty interrepresentation or concealment of material ests currently owned by him or in which he
facts made with knowledge, actual or con- [had] any interest" within one year of the
structive, of the facts to a party who is agreement Once the extent of defendwithout knowledge or the means of bowl- ant's holdings was determined, plaintiff
edge of the real facts and made with an was to receive one-half of defendant's inintention that the representation be acted terest in any stocks "held in. . [his] name
upon, and the party to whom the represen- or in which he [had] any interest," and
tatxm was made relies or acts upon it to his one-half of the sales proceeds of the
prejudice,
Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property
11 Estoppel^
located m Cache County, Utah.
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts Much of the dispute between the parties
of which party to be estopped had no centered around defendant's relationship to
)mkfcot
Owanah Oilforporation[Owanah], a closely held corporation which defendant and
li. Husband and Wife *279(1)
Francois deGunsberg had founded in 1952
Wife was not estopped from denying to engage in oil and gas exploration Dethat husband had furnished adequate ac- fendant had served as Owanah's president
counting as required by their divorce during much of the parties' marriage. In
ipeenent even though wife's attorney had 1969, Owanah wasrestructuredto gener»
ntnrned certain stock certificates whkh he ate outside capital, As a consequence, delad turned over to them.
fendant and plaintiff held approximately
11 Divorce ^2513(5)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in requiring husband to pay an amount
representing a percentage of the price of
proceeds from sale ofranchwhere he
found that husband held an interest in the
^
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twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding ant's earlier deposition contradicted this
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff
owned ffift of the Royalty stock. DeAt the tine of the divorce, defendant
also controlled stock, originally issued in fendant, in his personal financial state*
various names, in other closely held corpo- ments, valued the ranch at between $2509rations: Western Oil Shale Corporation, 000 and $1,000,000.
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Investment Company. Defendant claimed that
most of this stock belonged to Owanah,
was not part of the marital estate, and,
therefore, was not subject to the property
division agreement

In January 1982, Royalty sold the
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and authorized Owanah to use the proceeds, l i e
only consideration which Royalty received
for the proceeds was its choice between an
interest-bearing loan and a 4% overruling
royalty
interest in Owanah,
The Western 03 Shale Compy stock
was issued in 1964 in consideration for Defendant also claims that he made an
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leas- oral accounting pursuant to the property
es. Although defendant alleged that none settlement agreement with the law firm
of the parties' personal funds were expend- Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe
ed to acquire these leases, he introduced no and Fowler all stock certificates in the parevidence beyond his testimony to that ef- ties' safe deposit box. Because plaintiff
fect He ateo explained that the stock was was not satisfied that there had been an
issued in names other than Owanah's so adequate accounting under the terms of
that Owanah could sell it more easily by the property settlement agreement, she fiavoiding normal corporate formalities. At nally brought this action on Hay 29,1980,
the time of trial, he held at least 28^200 to compel the accounting and judgment for
Western Oil Shale shares under his person- any damages caused by defendant's delay
al control, but admitted ownership of only in submitting the accounting. The purpose
of the accounting was to identify the
2 # 6 of them.
Cayman stock had been issued by Cay- amount to which plaintiff was entitled as
man Corporation as consideration for stock her share of the marital estate.
in another closely held corporation, National Oil Shale Corporation, and for an oil and
gas lease with a producing oil well. Defendant testified that both the National Oil
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in
his name for ease in sale and handling, but
that he held them in trust for third parties.
However, he introduced no evidence other
than his testimony that there was an actual
trustrelationshipbetween himself and others. Part of the reason for his failure to
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman
and National Oil Shale corporate records.
At the time of trial, defendant held at least
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name.

The trial court agreed that defendant
had not made an adequate accounting, finding that Owanah was defendant's alter ego
even though this issue was not explicitly
raised in the pleadings. The court also
found that the assets subject to the accounting were, in fact, owned by defendant, and, pursuant to the tarns of the
settlement agreement, that plaintiff wis
entitled to one-half of those assets. However, because most of the assets had been
sold by defendant, the court established a
monetary value for the liquidated assets
and included that amount as part of the
marital estate to be distributed between
the
parties, Although this was an accountAt the time of the property settlement
agreement, Royalty Investment Company
owned, as its only major asset, the
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testi- stipulated property settlement agreement
fied that Owanah and two other parties had without objection by either party.
made installment payments on the ranch Defendant raises the following issues ea
and, thus, were entitled to W of Royal- appeal: (1) Was the alter ego issue proper
ty's outstanding stock. However, defend- ly before the trial court? {2) If the alter:

COLMANv, COLMAN
Utah 785
oumnmm (%fctot*7)
ego issue was property before the court, that was tried inadvertently." Mil Motor
was there sufficient evidence to sustain the G>„506F.2dat711.
court's finding that Owanah was defendlied consent to try an issue may be
p! (3) Does applying the al"where one party raises an issue
t a property distribomaterial to the other party's case or where
1
ticm contrary to th€ parties property distribotion agreement? (i) Did the evidence, evidence is introduced without objection,"
findings, and conclusions support the order (knml In Co.ofAn.fW Pid at 50506, where it "appeals] that the parties
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an
understood the evideice [in»]tobe aimed
amount representing a percentage of the
at
Anderson Ranch safe proceeds? (5) Is the impleaded issue." MMotorCo^
plaintiff estopped from denying that de- 506PidatTll See First Security Bank
ofUtohi, Colonial Ford, k , 5 9 7 P i d
fendant furnished a satisfactory account859,861 (Utah 1979).
ing?
Thus, the test for determining whether
pleadings should be deemed amended unUnder Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of der Utah R.Civ,P, 15(b) is "whether the
M Procedure, issues not raised by the opposing party had a fair opportunity to
pleadings may be tried by the express or
implied consent of the parties.1 The Utah
Supreme Court has observed that issues
tried by express or
treated as if raised in the
Therefore, "even failure to amend the
pleadings does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues/'
(knmlIuCo.of
An. t Cmicm Dynasty Corp., 545 ?M
502,506 (Utah 1976).

al evidence if the case were retried on a
different theory." UPohl Const Co. v.
Marshall, 640 Fid 266,267 (10th Cir.1981).
See also Cheney a Sucker, 14 Utah 2d
205,381R2d86,91(1963);MnerM
<ha^6Utih2d22U»PM7,
519-20(1957).

[1] If a theory ofrecoveryis fully tried
by the parties, the court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings
amended, even if the theory was not originally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings
or the pretrial order. Mil Motor Co, v.
Lotm/Eut, Inc., 506 F.2d 709,711 (6th
Gr.1974). However, that the issue has, in
fact, been tried, and that this procedure
has been authorized by express or implied
consent of the parties must be evident from
the record. Wirti t FM, Sloan, Inc., 285
P5upp. 669,675 (W.D.Pa.1968). "Atrial
court may not base its decision on an issue

[2] In the present case, even though the
alter ego issue was not specifically raised
in the pleadings, either initially or by
amendment, the entire trial testimony concerned defendant's control over the assets
in question. During trial, evidence concerning every element of the alter ego issue was introduced without objection. Further, the basic question raised in an alter
ego case is whether the principal had per
sonal control over assets which he claimed
to belong to the corporation. Since this
question is the essential issue presented by
this accounting action, we find that the
parties received adequate notice of the alter ego issue and an opportunity to meet it

I Utah R.CivJ> 15(b) (1977) reads as Mows:
When issues not raised by the pleading ire
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties.tbey shall be treated in all respectsas
if they had bees raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence tod to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after Judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these
isues. If evidence is objected to at the trial

on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to b e a m e d when the preset
tition of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defo* upon the merits.
The court shall grant a cwtttouance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
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I k e was no indication in the record that 370,510 P.2d 526,528 (1973); Geary *
defendant ever represented to the court Ctoi,79Utah268,9Pid396,398(1932),
that he was taken by surprise or was otlw It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter actualfraud,hut must only show that failegoissue. SeeChmyv.RwkerM?M uretopierce the corporate veil would reat 91. Wefind,therefore, that the alter sult in in injustice. HtalMn-Midtm
ego issue was properly before the court Convalescent Hosp, 511 F-Supp. at 420.
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed
II
significant, although not conclusive, in de[3,4] Ttoe is sufficient evidence to taining whether this test has been net
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one*
ah was defendant's altar ego. "Ordinarily, man corporation; (2) failure to observe cor
a corporation is regarded aa a separate and
distinct legal entity from its stockholders." idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by
Aodbtabrn VUfar9 29 Utah 2d S7Bf 610 the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctionPid 526,528 (1973). l b is true whether ing of other officers or directors; (6) abthe corporation has many stockholders or sence of corporate records; (7) the use of
only one. Ramsey v. Adams, 4 Kan. the corporation as a facade for operations
App.2d 184,603 P.2d 1025,1027 (1979); of the dominant stockholder or stockholdJDme v. Enc, 104 MkliApp. 700,305 ers; a and (8) the use of the corporate entiN.Wid 297,298 (1981). Consequently, the ty in promoting injustice or fraud. Ramcorporate veil which protects stockholders sey v. Adams, 603 Pid at 1028; Amoco
from individual liability will only be pierced Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589,
reluctantly and cautiously. Ramsey v. 567 P.2d 1337,1341-42 (1977). See also
Adams,m?.2Att\m;MliamB,RobRamirez v. United States, 514 FiSupp. 759,
trts, he v, McDrilling, Co,, 579 S.W.2d76344 (D.Puerto Rico 1981); Hedthm
335,345 (TexXiv.App.1979).
Midtwn Convalescent Hosp,, 511 FJSupp.
at
[5] To disregard the corporate entity 418-19; Dillman a Nobles, 351 Soid
under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 210,213-14 (Laipp.1977).
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a [8] The rationale used by courts in per
unity of interest and ownership that the mitting the corporate veil to be pierced a
separate personalities of the corporation that if a principal shareholder or owner
and the individual no longer exist, but the
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one on an interchangeable or joint basis is if
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, they were one, he is without standing to
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, complain when an injured party does the
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. same. Bone Constr. Co, v. Lewis, 148
Norman ft Murray Firtt Thrift <t LoanGaipp. 61,250 S.E.2d 861,863 (1978). In
Cb„ 596 P.2d 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). Ac- Lyons a Lyons, 340 So.2d 450,451 (Alt
cord United States v, HeaUhwin-MidtomCiv.App.1976), the court stated that la]
Convalescent Hosp, and Rehabilitationcourt of equity looks through form to subCenter, Inc., 511 F % 416 (CD.Calif. stance and has often disregarded the corpo1981). See also Centurian Corp, v, Fiber-rate form when it wasfictionin fact and
chm, Inc., 562 Pid 1252, 1253 (Utah deed and was merely serving the personal
mDochtaderv. Walker,%Mtt use and convenience of the owner," The
1 Failure to observe corporate formalities in- l Failure to distinguish between corporate u d
chides such activities ts commencement of busi- personal property, the use of corporate fundi to
ness without the issuance of shares, lack of pay personal expenses without proper aoooostfshareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of ing, and fiilure to maintiin coa^ete corponte
signing of consents, and the making of derisions and financial records art looked upon with *
by shareholders as if they were partners. /top treme disfavor. Royltx, 5S5 S.Wid at 772.
la,inc!.bmponBros.Constr.C(L,tt5VH2d
76S,772(TaCivipp.l979).
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Lyons court found a corporation to be a account Although he stated that this ocshareholder's alter ego, even though he curred because the bank initially preferred
owned cmly one share of stock, because be to deal personally with the principals becoisxniDgled corporate funds with his own, cause of Owanah's small net worth, he abo
kept no regular corporate records, meet- continued this practice well after Owanah
ipgs, or minutes asidefroma bank account, acquired substantia] assets, because, as he
and did not file corporate income tax re- st^ed, adjustments m loans and sales of
turn See Standage a Standage, 147 stock could be made without time^onsumAritApp. 473,711 Pid 612,614-15 (1985). ing corporate resolutions.
(J) Former spouses attempting to * Septenber 17, 1976, defendant
shield assets from a court-ordered property pledged 50,820 shares of Western Oil Shale
(fistnbution by using a corporate form are stock and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to
especially looked upon with judicial disfa- First Security Bank as collateral for loans
w. Sec Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz, to Owanah. He testified that this stock
App. 473,711 Pid 612 (1985); Colandrea M « i M f been issued in his, his brotha Colandm, 401 Aid 480 (MACtSpec er's, and his brokers names, rather than in
App.1979).
Owanah's name, so that corporate format
. ,
, .,
ties could be avoided in selling the stock.
.. i M ., ' .. ,. LA .... Between September 17,1978, and February
sidered the evidence in the light of this M 1(VTA. \ u
' 0. ;
i u « j - * w n . L i J *i 23,1979, he held as many as 93,298 shares
test,findingthat Owanah was defendant's '
A1 Cl1 ' , ' iQnM
..
.
,.
.
of
Western
Oi
l Shale stock and 48,000
u
m <<rA
alter ego on the grounds that 1 'ftjhew . in
. , . .. ' .
.. . JZ i
u- J• i shares of Cayman stock m his personal
of anyone
exists such a unity of ownership and inter- don. that
, he.. was/ acting on behalf
A kJT
else.
,,,
j / , . j / f L A.1 bank and brokerage accounts. Alltransacest between defendant and Owanah Oil First. Security
.. JrBank
. the 48,Al000
L. released
.
.
.
.
.
....
tons
dealing
with
these
shares
authon
shares of Cayman stock and 47,were
820 shares
Corporation mat the separate personakties of .the, ,Western
. . . Oil,Shale ,stock
lL x to defend,;.
,. /.. . j . . . .
rized
by
his
signature
without
suggesant on July 9,1979. The bankany
recognized
;
b
J
of the corporation and the individual no this stock as being defendant's personal
longer exist," and (2) to recognize such property in that it required defendant to
separate personalities "would promote in- sign an indemnity agreement to protect the
bank from any claim raised by plaintiff
justice and an inequitable result"
For purposes of appellate review, the against the shares.
trial court's decision to pierce the corporate Defendant testified that this stock, valveil will be upheld if there is substantial ued by the trial court at {14.25 per share,
evidence
in favor ofignored
the judgment
First, defendant
corporateStandfor- was later sold to fund one of Owanah's
age,
711
Pid
at
614-16.
An
examination
malities. He stated that he preferred to projects, and that the proceedsfromthis
of the present
trial business
record indicates
that sale were deposited in Owanah's account
conduct
corporate
personally,
there
was
substantial
evidence
supporting
rather than in the corporate name, because However, payments for defendant's resicourt's
findingthan
that observing
the separate
itthewastrialmore
convenient
ap- dential mortgage, tight and utility bills
personalities
of
Owanah
and
defendant
propriate corporate procedures, and re-no were also made directly from Owanah's
peatedly did so.
account, as were numerous cash payments
to defendant, totalling $22,695.25 within a
Second, defendant Medtodistinguish ^ m& p ^ To helpfinanceOwbetween corporate and personal property in anah's activities, defendant also mortgaged
ha business dealings.
the parties' Park City residence for $60,*
In correspondence wita Rrst Secnrity 000, applied part of the proceeds to a reducBank, defendant continually referred to the tion of Owanah's debt, and deposited the
Ovanah checking account as his personal remainder in Owanah's acconnt Defend-
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ant attains the mortgage payments nuute
on his behalf by Owanah as repayment by
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, defendant presented no evidence at trial that
he maintained any personal checking a t
cwat apart from Owanahi Personal and
corporate affairs appear to be bextricably
interwoven.

macy. Since defendant did not proffer testimony at trial of anyone other than himself, purporting to have an interest in Roy.
alty, Owanah, or the Anderscm Raudi, it s
difficult to view this transadioo u lay.
thing but a personal transaction done ender a corporate aegis. Thus, defendant1!
equivocal testimony regarding the ownerThird, the other officers and directors ship of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with
played Utile, if any, role in the operation of the lack of substantial evidence that Owandefendant's corporate entities. Defendant ah gave valuable consideration for the proproduced no evidence at trial, other than
his testimony, to indicate that others had a finding that the corporate shells were
any interest in Owanah, although the trial used as a facade for the transfer of proper
judge requested such evidence on several ty from a corporate shell that plaintiff had
occasions during the trial and the trial was some interest in to one in which she had
less interest
recessed for defendant to provide it
Fourth, there was an almost complete
failure to keep and maintain corporate
records. There was no evidence that
shareholder records were kept for Cayman
Corporation, even though such records
were repeatedly requested by plaintiffs
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant
was even given an opportunity by the court
to find and present them. Defendant was
similarly unable to produce any records
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or financial status of Royalty Investment Cor
poration, Defendant claimed that Owanah
owned Cayman stock as well as proceeds
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch,
which was owned by Royalty Investment

Further, defendant's use of Owanah to
receive the proceeds from the sale of the
Cayman and Western Oil Company stock,
coupled with his use of Owanah's account
to pay his personal living expenses, suggest that defendant was using Owanah as
a facade for his personal affairs.

Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and
the other corporate shells were used as a
facade for defendant's personal business
operations. The most significant evidence
was the method 'in which the Anderson
Ranch sale was consummated After the
property settlement agreement had been
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation
sold the ranch, using no corporate formalities, and then deposited the sale proceeds
in Owanah's bank account for a $ overriding royalty interest in the Owanah
project Plaintiff alleged that this was no
consideration at all Although the transa&
tin was ratified by Royalty on 4e advice
of counsel eleven months after the sale and
three days before trial, such a ratification
does not invest this transaction with legit*

Therefore, we find that there was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support its finding that defendant's corporations were actually his alter ego.

Finally, the use of the corporate entity in
this circumstance would result in injustice.
If viewed as legitimate corporate transae*
tions, plaintiffs post-settlement agreement
business transactions would convert sub*
stantial assets, which otherwise would be
regarded as marital property, to corporate
assets in which plaintiff had no interest
Such shielding of assets would result in a
great injustice to plaintiff.

Ill
Because application of the alter ego doe*
trine is justified, we reach the issue of
whether the property division by the trill
court is in harmony with the parties' property settlement apement Defendants
gues that the property division resulting
from the alter ego finding is contrary to
the intent of the property settlement agreement because it awards plaintiff more than
half of the marital estate, and, thus, it is
abuse of judicial discretion.

[10]
the trial court has wide discretion, and,
while the appellate court is not necessarily
bound by its findings, Tnompon %
J k m m W PJJ 360,361-62 (Utah
J are i

corporation formed
He alleged that a

ing their marriage,
which the

to a corporation which he and his wife
formed during the marriage. Because he
"utterly failed to prove that the loan did
indeed exist," in that he could produce no
papers documenting the loan, any terms,
conditions of repayment, or interest, and
because the trial court expressly found

cates such a manifest injustice or inequity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion
S m i E m n , 135 Pid 395,397 (Utah
CtApp.1987); Petmen a Ptterm, 737
Pid 237,239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regarding challenges to property distributions, sonal funds throughout the marriage so
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that that it could not trace any assets to any
source, the court found that he had failed
must prove a misunderstanding or misap- to carry his burden of proof. l i at 119.
plication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evi- [11] Similarly, the present defendant
dence clearly preponderated against the has failed to carry his burden of proof that
findings, or that such a serious inequity the disputed assets are corporate rather
resulted from the order as to constitute than personal property, so we find no
an abuse of the trial court's discretion abuse of discretion in the trial court's propifcCrory ^ i/cCror^ 599 P^d 1248,1250 erty division resulting from application of
(Utah 1979), That the property distribution the alter ego theory.
may not have been mathematically equal is
not sufficient grounds to constitute an
IV
abuse of discretion, since a fair and eqDefendant further argues that the trial
uitable property distribution is not necescourt's order requiring him to pay plaintiff
sarily an equal distribution See Fletcher
an amount representing a percentage of
t Fletcher, 615 Pid 1218,1223-24 (Utah
the price of the Anderson Ranch sale pro1980).
ceeds is without support in the findings,
Further, it is well recognized that a par- conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that
ties' stipulation as to property rights in a the trial judge has wide discretion in the
divorce action, although advisory and division of marital property, and his findusually followed unless the court finds it to ings will not be disturbed by an appellate
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessar- court unless the record shows a clear abuse
ily binding on the trial court It is only a of discretion. The Utah Supreme Court
recommendation to be adhered to if the has stated, in Pennon v. Pearson, 561 P.2d
court believes it to be fair and reasonable. at 1082, that
Peanon v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080,1082 in regard to the matter of the sufficien(Utah 1977); Klein i Klein, 544 M 472, cy of findings of fact, a substantial com476 (Utah 1975). Thus, even if the trial pliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
court does not exactly follow the parties' Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of
agreement, such a decree is still within the fact and conclusions of law will support a
trial court's reasonable discretion
judgment, though they are very general,
The Utah Supreme Court has previously where they in most respects follow the
upheld a trial court's property division un- allegation of the pleadings. Findings
der somewhat similar circumstances. In should be limited to the ultimate facts
h * l t ftity 728 ?3i 117 (Utah 1986), and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and
the defendant husband appealed from the sufficiently conform to the pleadings and
portion of a divorce decree awarding the the evidence to support the judgment,
plaintiff wife one-half of the value of a they will be regarded as sufficient,
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though not as full and as complete as
might be desired.
However, "to detormine if equity ww dcme,
we must hive before UB specific findings of
fact pertinent to that issue." Jomt
}<m TOO Pid 1072,1074 (Utah 1985);
^oyfa 9. Boyi^ 735 P.2d 669t 671 (Utah
OApp.1987).
[12] In the present case, the trial court
gpedfkadly found that ^ajt the time of the
parties' agreement, and until the property
was sold in January 1982, defendant held
title to 62Vz% interest in the ranch through
Royalty Investment Company. The ranch
was sold for $250,000,00 in January 1982,
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78r125.00, which is 31^5% of $250,000.00." It
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve
defendant's explanation of this property interest There was evidence in the record to
support such a finding, which is sufficient
to come within the guidelines outlined by
Peanon and Jonei
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
award with respect to the Anderson Ranch
V
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal
is whether plaintiff was estopped from denying that he furnished an adequate accounting. He alleges that he made an oral
accounting to the law firm of Roe and
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler
all the stock certificates in the parties' safe
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later returned some of these certificates to defendant Defendant argues that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon express or implied
representations that the accounting was
satisfactory because defendant made no
further demand for an accounting after
this event However, the document which
defendant received from Roe and Fowler
when it returned the certificates was only
an acknowledgement that the shares were
delivered into his control as president of
Owanah, rather than areleaseor exclusion
of the shares from an eventual accounting.
Further, plaintiff alleges that she was in

continual contact with
concerning his failure to make
had brought a
ant to enforce the
decree sad
agreement
stated that
she was
business affairs concerning the disputed
[13,14] Estoppel arises when there »
(1) a false representation or concealment of
material facts; (2) made with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the facta; (3)
made to a party who is without knowledge
or the means of knowledge of the m l
facts; (4) made with the intention that the
representation be acted upon; and (5) the
party to whom the representation was
made relied or acted upon it to his prejudice. M f f t J M X l M f i t y t t
P.2d731,734(1938); Jfotyant;Joanitf
State Unit, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 197J),
See alto City of Mercer hknd t Sitik
mann, 9 Washipp. 479,513 P.2d 80,82
(1973). If any of these elements are misting, there can be no estoppel My t
iftctonfc, 83 P.2d at 734. Further, estoppel cannot be inferred from facts of which
the party to be estopped had no knowledge.
Grwer v. Gorn, 23 Utah 2d 441,464 Pid
598,602 (1910).
[15] Estoppel is not applicable under
the present facts.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ..
concur.

(oforiwumitt)

Police, relying on information provided
by a confidential informant, obtained a
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
search warrant to search Holyoah premisRespondent,
es for cocaine, As a result of the search,
v.
they found a small plastic bag containing
Robert HOLYOAK, Defendant
cocaine hidden under Hoiyoak's water bed.
and Appellant
Prior to trial, Holyoak moved to suppress
the
admission of the cocaine on grounds
No. 868220-CA.
that the confidential informant's veracity
Court of Appeals of Utah.
and basis of knowledge were inadequate,
that corroboration of his information was
Oct 14,1987.
defective, as was the police affidavit based
on the informant's testimony, and, thereDefendant was charged with posses- fore, that there was insufficient probable
sion of cocaine. The District Court, Utah cause to issue the search warrant HolyCounty, Ray M. Harding, J., denied defend- oak moved alternatively for disclosure of
ant's pretrial motion to suppress and al- the informant's identity or for the court to
lowed introduction of cocaine into evidence mkA u in cmm "k* 1 of *•
and defendant was subsequently convicted. infonnant on ^ ^ *•* ^ w a s >»
Defendant appealed. Hie Court of Ap- ^ M mf^m Mormi<but M
peals, Garff, J., held that defendant failed the police officer had fabricated the affidato object to admissibility of cocaine evi- vit and had planted the cocame.
deuce at trial, and hence, could not raise A suppression hearing was held, and
even though testimony indicated that some
issue on appeal.
of the allegations in the police affidavit
Affirmed.
were false, the trial court denied all of
Holyoak's motions. Regarding the motion
to
suppress, the trial court stated that the
Criminal Law 01036.1(3)
Defendant failed to object to admissi- affidavit, viewed in its entirety, supported
bility of cocaine evidence at trial, and the issuance of the search warrant
hence, he could not raise on appeal issue At trial, the cocaine was introduced into
challenging denial of motion to suppress, evidence. Holyoak did not object to its
introduction, and was convicted by a jury
of possession of cocaine.
James G. Clark, Provo, for defendant fa appeal, Holyoak raises substantially
and appellant
the same issues as in the evidentiary hear
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., mg; (1) Should the cocaine obtained pursuSandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., for ant to the search warrant have been supplaintiff and respondent
pressed on grounds that there was no probable cause to support the search warrant?
(2)
Alternatively, should the trial court
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
have ordered disclosure of the identity of
GREENWOOD, JJ.
the confidential informant? (3) As a fur
ther alternative to suppressing the eviOPINION
dence or disclosing the identity of the inforGARFF, Judge:
mant, should the court have conducted an
in camm interview of the informant?
his conviction of possession of cocaine, a Our review of these questions, however,
third degree felony, on the grounds that depends upon whether these issues were
the trial court failed to suppress evidence preserved for appeaL Although Holyoak
c^btaiaedfromthe execution of an allegedly moved to suppress the cocaine prior to tridefective search warrant
al, he did not raise an objection at trial

